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INTRODUCTION
Lurking in plain sight at exits to certain United States government
buildings are fixed checkpoints where people are detained and their
personal belongings systematically searched before armed police officers give permission to depart the premises. The people subjected
to these “exit searches” have not given their consent, yet they cannot
refuse. These exit searches are not openly spoken about and have
never before been comprehensively catalogued or studied; consequently, no empirical data exist on their exact specifications or perva1
siveness. The discussion of these searches in this Essay comes from
their relatively brief mention in a lone judicial opinion, the author’s
personal experiences, and a single news article. Despite the apparent
lack of transparency in these programs, and perhaps because of it,
these programs must be carefully examined and ultimately found unconstitutional. In a time when the Executive Branch routinely trig2
gers concerns about privacy rights, discussions about the appropriate
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Associate, O’Melveny & Myers LLP. J.D., 2012, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
The author thanks Professor Stephanos Bibas and the staff of the University of Pennsylvania
Journal of Constitutional Law for invaluable assistance and insight in crafting this Essay.
The scope of this Essay is limited to searches of the personal items of people leaving government property; I have titled these “exit searches.” This Essay does not address the
constitutionality of searches being performed on people while they are exiting the United
States, something which has sporadically been referred to by courts as an “exit search.”
See, e.g., United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1295–96 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that the
border search exception to the Fourth Amendment “rests on the fundamental principle
of national sovereignty”).
See, e.g., David K. Shipler, Can You Frisk a Hard Drive?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2011, at WK5
(highlighting the practice by Customs and Border Protection officers of searching the
computers of certain individuals entering the country despite lacking any reasonable suspicion); Olivia Katrandjian, Strip-Searched Grandma Says TSA Removed Her Underwear, ABC
NEWS, Dec. 3, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2011/12/strip-searchedgrandma-says-tsa-removed-her-underwear/ (describing how a “mortified” octogenarian
was forced to remove her underwear by the Transportation Security Administration after
she refused an x-ray body scan at an airport security checkpoint); Somini Sengupta,
Drones May Set Off a Flurry of Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2012, http://bits.blogs.
nytimes.com/2012/02/20/drones-may-set-off-a-flurry-oflawsuits/ (describing how the
Federal Aviation Administration has approved the use of unmanned aerial drones in
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scope of individual privacy are necessary to prevent and reverse the
3
quiet erosion of Constitutional protections.
By its silence, Congress has tacitly approved warrantless, suspicionless exit searches of any person who enters a federal building, having
delegated its authority to the Executive Branch via a broad statute
which authorizes the Administrator of the General Services Administration (“GSA”) to “prescribe regulations that the Administrator
4
considers necessary to carry out the Administrator’s functions . . . .”
The GSA regulations codified pursuant to this general statute state,
“Federal agencies may, at their discretion, inspect packages, briefcases and other containers in the immediate possession of visitors, employees or other persons arriving on, working at, visiting, or departing
5
from Federal property.”
The Supreme Court has approved an exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s general prohibition on suspicionless searches for warrantless administrative searches in certain contexts, often citing the
6
“special needs” of government to conduct specific, limited searches.
Yet in virtually every case where the Court has approved a suspicionless search, the special need asserted was a safety or security interest;
later cases have unequivocally declared that a safety interest is required. No exit search identified in this Essay is used to respond to
any real, or even perceived, safety interest. Given these facts, the routine suspicionless search of employees and visitors departing federal
property must be unconstitutional—a violation of their Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Part I of this Essay describes, with as much precision as possible,
the details of exit search programs as they presently exist. Part II explains the principles underlying the Fourth Amendment’s blanket
ban on unreasonable searches and traces the rise of the administrative search exception. It further explores how the Supreme Court
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United States airspace and how this is likely to lead to challenges under the Fourth
Amendment).
Indeed, decisionmakers may well be listening to the popular and academic outcry that
such privacy violations have engendered. For example, the Ninth Circuit recently held
that the government may not conduct border searches of personal computer devices
without at least some “reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Cotterman, No. 09-10139,
2013 WL 856292 at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2013) (en banc).
40 U.S.C. § 121(c) (2006).
41 C.F.R. § 102-74.370 (2011) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653, 665 (1995) (upholding drug testing of student athletes without a warrant by a school district under a “special needs” exception); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding toxicological testing of railway workers without a warrant or reasonable suspicion under a “special
needs” exception).
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has recently heightened its scrutiny of special needs searches, making
plain that any constitutional administrative search must be based on a
particularized safety interest. Part III examines the Ninth Circuit case
United States v. Gonzalez, the only case holding an exit search constitutional, but offers a number of reasons—such as a decidedly unsympathetic defendant who was caught stealing and the ineffective assistance of his counsel—for the erroneous ruling. Part IV revisits exit
searches in light of recent Supreme Court precedent and the arguments proffered in Gonzalez, and suggests these exit searches may be
unconstitutional. Finally, Part V discusses three potential objections
to the assertion that exit searches are unconstitutional—lack of expectation of privacy, consent, and a hypothetical safety-justified exit
search—and rejects each objection in turn.
I. DEFINITION & SCOPE OF EXIT SEARCHES
The federal administrative regulations governing exit searches
7
were codified in 2003. These regulations give blanket authority to
every federal agency to conduct searches of every individual’s personal
8
effects upon entering or exiting any federal property. Entry searches
of both employees and visitors to government buildings have been
approved by the courts for decades; these courts cite the safety concerns associated with building entry as the constitutional justification
9
for their use. Exit searches, on the other hand, do not enjoy the
10
same historical judicial approval.
Although it is unclear for how long exit searches have been per11
mitted or performed, such searches were conducted on at least
7

8
9

10
11

Compare 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.370 (2003) (containing a specific provision for exit searches),
with 41 C.F.R § 102-74 (2002) (failing to contain any provision specifically allowing for exit searches).
41 C.F.R. § 102-74.370 (2011) (giving express authority to all federal agencies to conduct
such searches “at their discretion”).
See, e.g., Justice v. Elrod, 832 F.2d 1048, 1050 (7th Cir. 1987) (denying appeal of motion
to dismiss in the case of an attorney who refused to be searched before entering a courthouse, and was thus denied entry, because such a search is “constitutionally unproblematic where as here there is some reason—there needn’t be much—to expect that armed
and dangerous people might otherwise enter”); McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 899–
901 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding entry searches instituted at a San Francisco courthouse in
1974 because of “threats of violent acts directed at courthouses”); Downing v. Kunzig, 454
F.2d 1230, 1231-33 (6th Cir. 1972) (finding entry searches to federal buildings—
instituted because of “bombings of federal buildings and hundreds of bomb threats”—
constitutional because of the imminent safety threat and the “minimal interference . . . with personal freedom”).
See infra Part III (describing the history of the special needs search exception to the
Fourth Amendment).
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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some federal properties at least as far back as the year 2000—three
12
years prior to the passage of the GSA regulations. Unfortunately,
there has been no comprehensive research completed into which
federal agencies conduct these exit searches; however, I know from
personal experience and research that a variety of agencies have so
13
availed themselves.
Agencies conducting searches often post warning signs outside
their buildings notifying those entering of the searches taking place
inside. Exit searches are conducted by uniformed law enforcement
officials, rather than agency administrators. They involve the opening and physical inspection of the contents of each exiting individual’s packages, briefcases, papers, and other effects being carried out
of the building. In certain cases, exit searches may involve an individual again passing through a metal detector, as they did during
14
their entry search.
The true purpose of an exit search must be to apprehend thieves
concealing government property within their personal items; this is
the most important feature distinguishing entry searches from exit
searches. Entry searches are for the limited purpose of maintaining
15
safety in buildings by detecting weapons or explosives. On the other
hand, exit searches cannot be for safety purposes—any safety threat is
already dealt with through a previously-conducted entry search. Further, there is no attendant safety threat in the exit search context because the subjects are exiting, and are by definition not threatening
the building.
Another important feature distinguishing exit searches from entry
searches is that individuals are not permitted to avoid exit searches.
12

13

14

15

See United States v. Gonzalez, 300 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the exit
search of an employee of the McChord Air Force Base Exchange by a store detective
which took place in the year 2000).
For example, agencies as disparate as the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) and
the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. conduct routine entry and exit searches of
both employees and visitors. I was exit-searched dozens of times at the BEP between 2010
and 2011, and know from conversations with BEP employees that these searches continue
to be performed in 2013. I was exit-searched at the Library of Congress in the Summer of
2010. As Gonzalez made clear, exit searches have, at least at some point, been conducted
in commissaries on military bases. Id. See also Tim Richardson, What Drives People to Steal
TIMES,
March
6,
2009,
Precious
Books,
FINANCIAL
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d41a83d6-09dc-11de-add8-0000779fd2ac.html.
Cf.
United States v. Kroesser, 731 F.2d 1509, 1511-12 (11th Cir. 1984) (describing employee
theft from BEP).
This Essay will, however, focus exclusively on the exit searches of “packages, briefcases
and other containers,” 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.370, as it is unclear whether a second pass
through a metal detector is affirmatively implemented and approved or rather incidental
to exiting in certain cases.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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When entering a building, a person’s right to simply walk away is paramount to the reasonableness of the search because the entire pro16
cess is governed by individual choice. Exit searches have no such
protection; once an individual has entered the government building,
he is unable to leave that building until an exit search of their items is
17
completed. Choice, and thus consent, is eliminated in the case of
an exit search.
Exit searches are systematically conducted on every departing individual. They are not incident to a criminal investigation. A warrant
is never issued prior to their being performed. Probable cause is not
required, nor is even individualized suspicion that the subject has
done something wrong. In sum, these are blanket, suspicionless
searches conducted by law enforcement officers on individuals who
have chosen to set foot in a government building, and who have already undergone one search as a condition of entry to the building.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S PROTECTIONS
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea18
sonable searches and seizures . . . .” The Amendment was designed
largely as an answer to the abuses the Framers had observed while
they were citizens of Great Britain, especially the exercise of the general warrant and the nearly limitless discretion it gave government of19
ficials to conduct searches. This Amendment is particularly concerned with consent. That is, every person has the choice about what
20
The
information to conceal from publicity and what to reveal.
16

17

18
19
20

See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910–11 (9th Cir. 1973) (“airport screening
searches are valid only if they recognize the right of a person to avoid search by electing
not to board the aircraft”), overruled by United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960–62 (9th
Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that “[t]he constitutionality of an airport screening search,
however, does not depend on consent” because that “makes little sense in a post-9/11
world”). Consent nevertheless does play at least some small part post-9/11, as the Court
in Aukai noted that “all that is required [for the search to be reasonable] is the passenger’s election to attempt entry into the secured area of an airport.” Id. at 961 (footnote
omitted).
If someone could simply refuse the exit search and leave the building, the purpose of the
exit search would be defeated. Anyone who wished to avoid the search to could merely
walk away without having to undergo any search at all. Exit searches definitionally, and
practically, hinge on a lack of ability to withdraw from being searched.
U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
See generally Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547 (1999).
See, e.g., Steven L. Willborn, Consenting Employees: Workplace Privacy and the Role of Consent,
66 LA. L. REV. 975, 979 (2006) (“[P]rotection when consent is withheld affirms society’s
respect for an individual’s control over central aspects of his own existence.”).
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Fourth Amendment has nothing to say regarding information a person has freely chosen to reveal; this information is not private, and
not protected. Regarding the things a person has elected to keep secreted, however, the government may search them—and in so doing
destroy their privacy—only when the search is objectively reasonable.
This standard of reasonableness is usually enforced by requiring the
government to obtain a warrant upon an affidavit of probable cause
21
prior to conducting a search.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees protection against govern22
mental intrusion into personal effects. The fact that a person carries a closed bag in public or to work does not make the contents of
that bag subject to a lesser expectation of privacy than if the bag were
23
left at home. Thus, the “packages, briefcases and other containers”
24
subject to exit searches under GSA regulation are definitionally
Fourth Amendment concerns.
Ensuring that these personal items are protected from unreasonable searches does not interfere with the proper functioning of government or rely on the assertion of mere technicalities. On the contrary, the Fourth Amendment was broadly designed to protect the
liberty of individuals from government invasion of their private lives,
safeguarding their privacy and security against arbitrary invasion; the25
se protections are “basic to a free society.” As Justice O’Connor
wrote, “Blanket searches . . . can involve ‘thousands or millions’ of
searches [and] ‘pos[e] a greater threat to liberty’ than do suspicion26
based ones, which ‘affec[t] one person at a time.’” The power to
27
search carries with it “a vast potential for abuse,” which is precisely
the reason that power should be as circumscribed as possible.

21

22

23

24
25
26
27

U.S. CONST., amend. IV (“[A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.”); see also, e.g., Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699,
705 (1948) (“It is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods or articles, law enforcement agents
must secure and use search warrants wherever reasonably practicable.”).
See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain
view.”).
See United States v. Chadwick, 433 US 1, 11 (1977) (“No less than one who locks the
doors of his home against intruders, one who safeguards his personal possessions . . . is
due the protection of the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause.”).
41 C.F.R. § 102-74.370 (2011).
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 43 (1961).
Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 667 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
United States v. Bulacan, 156 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Soyland, 3 F.3d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)).
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A. The Fourth Amendment & The Administrative Search
Exit searches fall into the category of searches that have often
been politely termed “administrative” or “special needs” searches.
The most obvious— and likely only—purpose of an exit search is to
ensure that government-owned property is not stolen from federal
28
buildings. These searches are not incident to a criminal investigation, but instead are simply rote searches of every person exiting a
building. Although administrative searches lack individualized suspicion and are certainly devoid of probable cause, the Supreme Court
has historically carved out an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
strict warrant rule specifically for them. However, this exception has
been subject to much stricter review by the Court over the past fifteen
years, turning what was once a very deferential review of any “special
need” asserted by the government into a more searching analysis,
making the legal application of administrative searches more narrow
29
than ever.
B. Exception to the Warrant Requirement for Administrative Searches
The following Part is a brief chronological review of important
cases in which the Supreme Court approved suspicionless searches of
individuals, homes, or personal effects between 1967 and 1997. The
jurisprudence begins with the most limited acceptance of this category of searches yet culminates three decades later with near extreme
deference to assertions by the government of “special needs” so as to
justify the use of suspicionless searches. The purpose of this Part is
not to cover in great detail all of the facts of these cases; rather, it is
designed to provide a limited overview of the Court’s slide into deference prior to a discussion in Part II.C, infra, of the tightening of its
30
standard review in these cases.
The first case in which the Supreme Court brought administrative
searches under Fourth Amendment scrutiny was Camara v. Municipal
31
Court. There, the Court generally held that the administrative inspection of a rented apartment by a city inspector looking for viola28
29

30
31

See supra note 13.
See generally Scott E. Sundby, Protecting the Citizen “Whilst He Is Quiet”: Suspicionless Searches,
“Special Needs” and General Warrants, 74 MISS. L.J. 501, 549 (2004) (describing how the
Court has “moved suspicionless programs away from executive and legislative discretion
granted to ‘petty officers’ and towards a Fourth Amendment that constrains discretion by
the need to show suspicion of wrongdoing or by demonstrating the existence of a compelling justification for dispensing with individualized suspicion”).
For a more comprehensive review of related cases, see RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL 597-630 (2011).
387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
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tions of the Housing Code was a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment, by “balancing the need to search against the invasion
32
which the search entails.” Informing the government interest side
of the balancing test was the fact that “the public interest demands
that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable re33
sults.” Although it held that these types of searches are reasonable,
34
the Court required that an administrative warrant be obtained by
the housing inspector before the state could trump a person’s refusal
35
of access to his private residence. It is important to note that the
governmental need making this search reasonable was a safety concern—the prevention and abatement of dangerous conditions.
Applying the framework announced in Camara, the Court over the
next thirty years developed a jurisprudence that found reasonable
every assertion of a governmental interest in an administrative search
case. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Court approved suspicionless border searches of motor vehicles for illegal aliens by way of a
36
fixed roadside checkpoint. In this case the Court discarded the administrative warrant requirement that was held so important in Cama37
However, the Court purported to limit Martinez-Fuerte to its
ra.
facts—permitting only short stops for questioning at fixed border
38
checkpoints without a warrant or individualized suspicion.
The Court did not stop at border checkpoints, however, despite
Martinez-Fuerte allegedly being confined to its facts. Just three years
later in Bell v. Wolfish, the Court upheld body cavity searches without
individualized suspicion of prison inmates who had recent contact
32
33
34

35

36
37

Id. at 536-37.
Id. at 537.
Unlike a traditional warrant, this special administrative warrant required no probable
cause or individualized suspicion. Id. at 532. It instead was an official document that afforded the person whose house was being searched a “way of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises . . . of knowing
the lawful limits of the inspector’s power to search, and . . . of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization.” Id.
Id. at 539-40 (“[W]e therefore conclude that appellant had a constitutional right to insist
that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may not constitutionally
be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection.”).
428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976).
Id. at 564-65.
We do not think . . . that Camara is an apt model. It involved the search of private residences,
for which a warrant traditionally has been required. . . . The degree of intrusion upon privacy
that may be occasioned by the search of a house hardly can be compared with the minor interference with privacy resulting from the mere stop for questioning as to residence.

38

Id. at 567 (“We have held that checkpoint searches are constitutional only if justified by
consent or probable cause to search. And our holding today is limited to the type of stops
[border checkpoint stops] described in this opinion.”) (citation omitted).
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with non-inmates, citing the safety concerns associated with the
39
uniquely dangerous environment present in prison. The growing
spiral into deference had begun.
Six years later, in T.L.O., the Court crafted a new, overarching
40
phrase to describe these searches: “special needs” searches. The
Court approved a warrantless search performed by a school principal
41
of a student who was suspected of possessing drugs. Unlike MartinezFuerte or Wolfish, the school administrator did have individualized sus42
picion, although he did not have a warrant or probable cause. The
Court explained that strict adherence to the probable cause requirement in a school setting was not necessary, and pointed out that administrators have the special need “to maintain order” in school
43
while they stand in loco parentis—a safety interest.
Two terms later, in O’Connor v. Ortega, a plurality of the Court approved the special-needs-based administrative search of a state em44
ployee’s desk and file cabinet for evidence of wrongdoing. This case
45
will be returned to at much greater detail later in this Essay.
The Court in New York v. Burger approved the warrantless search of
an automobile junkyard, citing the safety concerns associated with a
46
highly regulated industry. Later, in the companion cases of Skinner
and Von Raab, the Court extended this line of special needs jurisprudence to allow drug testing of employees whose drug use might pose
a public safety concern. In Skinner the concern had been proven in
47
the record, but in Von Raab the safety interest was merely specula48
tive.
The 1990 case Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz approved
drunk driving checkpoints without a warrant or individualized suspicion, based on the safety interest associated with maintaining safe
49
roads free of intoxicated drivers. This case was clarified and limited
39
40

41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

49

441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979).
New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Only in those
exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court
entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.”).
Id. at 346-48.
Id. at 345-46.
Id. at 341.
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (plurality opinion).
See Part V.A, infra.
482 U.S. 691, 693, 703 (1987).
489 U.S at 628.
Nat’l Treasury Emps.’ Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 684 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(discussing his move from the majority in Skinner to the dissent here in Von Raab, because
of a dearth of “well-known or well-demonstrated evils” presented in the facts of Von Raab,
in marked contrast with Skinner).
496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
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later in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 50 a case discussed in the next
Part.
The last major case expanding the special needs jurisprudence
was Vernonia School District v. Acton, which approved the drug testing
of high school student athletes without individualized suspicion or
51
probable cause. This was a departure even from T.L.O., discussed
supra, in which the school principal did have individualized suspicion
52
of the student who was searched. The Court in Acton discussed the
fact that school officials stand in loco parentis to minor children at
53
school, as in T.L.O., and that instead of searching an entire school,
the program was “directed more narrowly to drug use by school athletes, where the risk of immediate physical harm to the drug user or
54
those with whom he is playing his sport is particularly high.”
Acton, decided in 1995, was the last case in which the Court was
deferential to government in evaluating a claim of special needs to
justify a search. The opinion served to open up all manner of students to drug testing without individualized suspicion even though
the articulated safety interest was arguably much more attenuated
than in any of the past special needs cases just discussed. Perhaps
understanding this deference to be spiraling into a serious problem,
the Court did an about-face and began to significantly contract this
55
line of reasoning.
C. Contraction of the Administrative Search Exception
The Court began the diminution of this near-complete deference
56
when it decided Chandler v. Miller in 1997. There, the Court struck
down a Georgia law that required all candidates for public office—
despite a lack of evidence of illegal drug use by any of those candidates—to submit to warrantless, suspicionless drug tests. Such a
search regime, the Court held, was not staked on any legitimate spe57
cial need, but was merely symbolic. The Court began its opinion by
reaffirming the general precept that searches are ordinarily unrea-

50
51
52
53
54
55

56
57

531 U.S. 32, 39 (2000).
515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
515 U.S. at 654-55.
Id. at 661-62.
See Sundby, supra note 30, at 515 (describing the recognition by the Court that its former
special needs jurisprudence created the specter of a return to the vices of the general
warrant, and its initial reaction to this problem in Chandler v. Miller).
520 U.S. 305 (1997).
Id. at 322 (“The need revealed, in short, is symbolic, not ‘special,’ as that term draws
meaning from our case law.”).
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sonable without at least some measure of individualized suspicion. 58
Particularly important in this case is the Court’s reiteration of a pervasive theme from the earlier, pre-contraction cases: “[W]here the
risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless
searches calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’—for example, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and
59
The Court continued, “But
other official buildings.”
where . . . public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth
Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how con60
veniently arranged.” Arguably faced with the consequences of its
deferential jurisprudence—a suspicionless search regime foisted on
candidates for elective office despite lacking evidence of drug
abuse—the Chandler Court heightened its scrutiny and began to restrict the scope of the earlier cases.
Not wavering from its Chandler reasoning, the Court in City of Indi61
anapolis v. Edmond struck down a random narcotics checkpoint, one
that the district court had upheld relying on reasoning of Sitz and
62
Martinez-Fuerte. In Edmond, the Court made even more explicit the
new, searching analysis it applies to assertions by government agencies of “special needs” allowing them to conduct suspicionless searches without offending the Constitution. The Court held that every
suspicionless search must be carefully scrutinized by the judiciary to
ensure that the primary purpose of the search is not a bad faith “pre63
text for gathering evidence of violations of the penal laws.” Analyzing the precedent of Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, and holding them to
their facts, the majority cited the “considerations specially related to
64
the need to police the border” and the “imperative of highway safe65
ty” as the safety-based special needs present in those two cases. However, the Court held that the narcotics checkpoint in Edmond was
58
59

60
61
62
63

64
65

Id. at 308.
Id. at 323 (emphasis added). It is crucial to note that the Court describes entry searches at
public buildings and airports as motivated by public safety concerns and thus eminently
reasonable. However, it noticeably fails to mention exit searches.
Id.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
See Edmond v. Goldsmith, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45. This subjective evaluation of the government’s motives stands in
direct contrast with judicial evaluation of every other kind of search under the Fourth
Amendment, where only objective evaluations of reasonableness are permitted. See Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811 (1996) (“But only an undiscerning reader would regard these [suspicionless search] cases as endorsing the principle that ulterior motives
can invalidate police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause to believe
that a violation of law has occurred.”).
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38.
Id. at 39.
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starkly different; its primary purpose was the advancement of “the
66
general interest in crime control,” therefore making it unconstitutional. Where a search involves law enforcement and the pursuit of
67
crime control, individualized suspicion is an irreducible component.
The Court did clarify that its holding did not overrule Sitz or MartinezFuerte, however, but confirmed that these two holdings are limited to
allowing suspicionless searches only when public safety is genuinely at
68
issue.
Finally, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court extended the
reasoning of Chandler and Edmond to strike down a hospital-based,
suspicionless program of drug-testing pregnant women, where those
who tested positive were reported to law enforcement officials as
69
criminal suspects. Although the Court left open the possibility that
such searches would not be unreasonable had the subjects consent70
ed, it essentially ignored the issue in its analysis and assumed that no
71
informed consent was given. Given that posture, the Court smoothly dispensed with the government’s asserted special need of medical
health concerns, holding that such searches do not rise to the level of
reasonableness required to permit a suspicionless search. The government’s stated purpose was “ultimately indistinguishable from the
72
general interest in crime control” as the “immediate objective of the
73
searches was for general evidence for law enforcement purposes.” Paramount to this holding was the fact that at least the threat of law enforcement involvement was present: “In other special needs cases, we
have tolerated suspension of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant or

66
67

68

69

70
71

72
73

Id. at 44 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979)).
Id. at 47 (“When law enforcement authorities pursue primarily general crime control
purposes at checkpoints such as here, however, stops can only be justified by some quantum of individualized suspicion.”).
Id. at 47-48 (“Our holding also does not affect the validity of border searches or searches
at places like airports and government buildings, where the need for such measures to
ensure public safety can be particularly acute.”).
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S 67, 69-72 (2001) (noting that those testing positive faced potential charges of simple possession, possession and distribution to a person
under the age of 18, or unlawful neglect of a child).
Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 76 (“[W]e necessarily assume for the purpose of our decision . . . that the searches
were conducted without the informed consent of the patients.”). Even on remand from
the Supreme Court to consider consent, the Fourth Circuit held that consent was not
present in the case. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 308 F.3d 380, 386 (4th Cir. 2002)
(“[N]o rational jury could conclude . . . that the Appellants gave their informed consent
to the taking and testing of their urine for evidence of criminal activity for law enforcement purposes.”).
Id. at 81 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (quotation
marks omitted)).
Id. at 83.
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probable cause requirement in part because there was no law enforcement purpose behind the searches in those cases, and there was
74
little, if any, entanglement with law enforcement.”
Thus, the Court has significantly heightened its scrutiny when the
government asserts a special needs justification for conducting war75
rantless, suspicionless searches. Although the special needs claims
approved in the pre-1997 cases often had only an attenuated relation
to safety, the Court has since made explicit that a special needs
search must have a safety interest at stake. Further, the Court has
made clear that a legitimate safety interest must be apparent, not fabricated, and certainly not a pretext for law enforcement officers to
enforce the penal laws. Moreover, the involvement of law enforcement with any suspicionless search regime makes it instantly suspect
and subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. Any suspicionless search
that fails this strict, non-deferential analysis is an unconstitutional violation of the subject’s Fourth Amendment rights.
III. PRIOR APPLICATION OF THE WARRANT EXCEPTION TO EXIT
SEARCHES
Only one case has ever explicitly dealt with the issue of the constitutionality of an exit search. In that case, the Ninth Circuit found
76
constitutional the exit search with which it was presented.
A. United States v. Gonzalez
The Ninth Circuit dealt with this matter as one of first impression.
Unaided by both litigants—who proved unable to cite much, if any,
relevant case law in their briefs—the court was unable to uncover of
77
its own accord anything directly on point. The case was not appealed to the Supreme Court, and so the Court has never been pre74
75

76
77

Id. at 79 n. 15 (citing Skinner, Von Raab, and Acton).
The Court has not struck down every search justified by special needs since 1997. For example, in Illinois v. Lidster, the Court found reasonable a “highway checkpoint where police stopped motorists to ask them for information about a recent hit-and-run accident.”
540 U.S. 419, 421 (2004). Despite applying the heightened scrutiny afforded suspicionless searches found Chandler, Edmond, and Ferguson, the Court found the search in Lidster
reasonable because its primary purpose was not general crime control, and it was designed to elicit information about people who were not stopped at the checkpoint. Id. at
423. Furthermore, public safety was at issue in that the police were searching for the specific perpetrator of a violent crime. Id. at 427.
United States v. Gonzalez, 300 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 2002) (“This search was reasonable.”).
Id. at 1052 (“Oddly, neither Gonzalez nor the government cites any authority in point on
government employer random theft searches of employees’ closed containers, and we
have found none.”).
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sented with the opportunity to consider the merits of exit searches directly.
The facts of Gonzalez are relatively straightforward. Gonzalez was
an employee of the McChord Air Force Base Exchange, a military
78
department store near Tacoma, Washington. While Gonzalez was a
79
government employee, he was not a member of the military (military exchanges are operated by a civilian Department of Defense
80
Agency called the Army and Air Force Exchange Service). Gonzalez
had previously signed a form stating that he consented to being
searched as a condition of employment, although the opinion did
81
not provide the exact language of the agreement. One day, Gonzalez was randomly exit-searched as he was leaving work by a “store de82
tective” who did not have a warrant, probable cause, or even indi83
vidualized suspicion. The sole purpose of the search was “to deter
84
and apprehend theft by employees.”
This search turned up four packages of spark plugs priced at
$3.75 each ($15 total), which Gonzalez had attempted to steal by
85
concealing them in his closed, personal backpack. In pretrial motions before the district court, and on appeal, Gonzalez alleged that
this exit search was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; he
further alleged that any consent he had allegedly given to be
86
searched was invalid.
The court began its analysis by ignoring the issue of consent, tacit87
ly admitting its unimportance to the analysis. The court then con78
79
80
81

82
83
84

85
86
87

Id. at 1050.
Id.
See AAFES, About Exchange, available at http://www.shopmyexchange.com/
aboutexchange/.
Id. at 1052 (“Mr. Gonzalez signed or initialed some sort of paper when he started work
that indicated his understanding that belongings such as his backpack might be inspected, but the government did not submit the paper as evidence, so we don’t know what it
says.”). Despite the insufficiency of the government’s evidence, Gonzalez’s counsel conceded the point as well. Id. (“Nevertheless, Mr. Gonzalez concedes that he signed or initialed some such paper when he commenced work at the base exchange, that he knew
such random searches were store policy, and that he allowed the search of the backpack
because and only because he felt he had no choice.”).
United States v. Gonzalez, 300 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1051.
Id. Moreover, the court continued, “Here there was no individualized suspicion, and the
government interest for which the search was instituted was merely prevention of employee theft, as opposed to preserving human life and safety or national security.” Id. at
1052.
Id. at 1050, n.2.
Id. at 1051-52.
United States v. Gonzalez, 300 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We do not reach the issue of whether Mr. Gonzalez consented to the search, or whether there was anything defective about his consent.”). See also Part V.A.1, infra (discussing how judicial restraint
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tinued on to the constitutional issue of the individualized suspicion
requirement and found that the search was reasonable, despite the
88
lack of individualized suspicion or probable cause. Although the
court initially considered language from O’Connor in formulating
analysis, which specifically states, “[t]he appropriate standard for a
workplace search does not necessarily apply to a piece of closed per89
sonal luggage,” the court ultimately rejected it and found the exit
90
search “reasonable under the circumstances.” In reaching this con91
clusion, the court cited only T.L.O. and its own case, United States v.
92
Bulacan, for support, both of which the court admitted were “distin93
guishable.” T.L.O. considered the search of a high school student
by a school administrator who stood in loco parentis and who had in94
Bulacan involved an entry
dividualized suspicion of wrongdoing.
search to a government building designed specifically for the purpose
95
of dealing with security threats. Despite the stark disparity between
these cases and the facts of Gonzalez, and the existence of the contrary
96
cases of Chandler, Edmond, and Ferguson, the court nevertheless
found the exit search of Gonzalez reasonable—substituting its own
sensibilities regarding how to run a business for sound legal judg97
ment provided by following Supreme Court precedent.
B. Explication of the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling in Gonzalez
A combination of factors created the perfect storm that produced
the puzzling ruling in Gonzalez. The first and perhaps most important
issue is that Gonzalez was a particularly unsympathetic defendant.
The initial discussion in the opinion dealt with the government’s ar-

88
89
90
91
92
93

94
95
96
97

principles require that cases be resolved on the non-constitutional issue whenever possible).
Gonzalez, 300 F.3d. at 1055.
Id. at 1053 (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716 (1987)) (internal quotations
omitted).
Id. (quoting Ortega v. O’Connor, 146 F.3d 1149, 1158 (9th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotations omitted).
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); see also Part II.B, supra.
156 F.3d 963, 964 (9th Cir. 1998).
Gonzalez, 300 F.3d at 1053 (“In Bulacan, the search was of a woman’s handbag as she came
into a government building. The search was for security threats to those in the building,
not for things stolen from the building.”) (citing Bulacan, 156 F.3d at 966) (footnote
omitted).
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
Gonzalez, 300 F.3d at 1053-54 (“In Bulacan, the justification for the search was protection
of the people in the building from explosives and weapons . . . .”).
See Part II.C, supra. None of these cases were considered by the court in its Gonzalez opinion.
Gonzalez, 300 F.3d at 1054 (“It’s hard to run a store if the employees walk out with the
inventory.”).
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gument that Gonzalez had been a fugitive from the law, or at least
had not complied with the conditions of the sentenced probation
98
pursuant to his conviction. Further, from the outset, the court was
99
“dismay[ed]” that this case should ever have reached its bench.
Concerning the court’s marked lack of sympathy for the defendant, it is undisputed that Gonzalez was factually guilty of theft. Gonzalez was not an innocent person who was unreasonably searched; rather, Gonzalez was a decidedly guilty defendant attempting to use the
Fourth Amendment as a shield to exclude from consideration the evidence of his misdeed. Furthermore, there is an acute problem of
courts routinely producing bad law in the context of Fourth Amendment violations in criminal cases; the remedy for a violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights is merely suppression at trial of
100
the illegally obtained evidence. The innocent citizen whose privacy
rights have been violated by government actors but who is not
charged with a crime is effectively stuck in an impossible “remedial
gap”—“left to pay for the government’s constitutional wrong,” the
victim of a regime that “can in many cases recover from neither the
101
[offending] officer nor the government.”
The criminal defendant is an “awkward champion” of Fourth
Amendment
rights,
who
“is
self-selected
and
selfserving . . . unrepresentative of the larger class of law-abiding citi102
This defendant is “despised by the public, the class he imzens.”
plicitly is supposed to represent,” and cares “only about exclusion—
and can get only exclusion—even if other remedies (damages or in-

98

99

100

101

102

Id. at 1051. The government argued that Gonzalez was, at least for a time, a fugitive, and
consequently his appeal should have been dismissed pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. Id. Although the court rejected this argument, it certainly set the stage
for denial of Gonzalez’s appeal on other grounds.
Id. at 1050 n.2 (“We share the reader’s dismay that this constitutional question should be
posed, and that Mr. Gonzalez should have imposed criminal consequences upon himself,
over $15 worth of spark plugs.”).
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies
both in federal and state courts, and that this ruling “close[d] the only courtroom door
remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic
right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct”).
Akhil Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 812 (1994); see also
MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES, AND
EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 425 (3d. Ed. 2007) (discussing the fact that there exist, in theory,
private remedies for victims of unreasonable searches and seizures, but that these are not
a “common method of dealing with improper searches or seizures” as the plaintiffs encounter large legal obstacles such as sovereign immunity for states and qualified immunity for state actors).
Amar, supra note 101, at 796.
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junctions) would better prevent future violations.” 103 The exclusionary rule “renders the Fourth Amendment contemptible in the eyes of
judges and citizens,” and consequently, judges “distort doctrine,
104
claiming the Fourth Amendment was not really violated.” This was
precisely the case in Gonzalez—an unsavory defendant caused the creation of yet another example of bad law in the Fourth Amendment
arena.
As if Gonzalez being an unsympathetic defendant were not
enough to produce this aberrant result, his counsel was so inadequate
in representing him that it likely rose to the level of ineffective assis105
tance of counsel. Despite the fact that Gonzalez was argued before a
panel of the Ninth Circuit in October of 2001, Gonzalez’s public defender failed to cite any of the aforementioned dispositive cases:
106
Chandler, Edmond, Ferguson. Had this lawyer made arguments based
on the changes evident in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding suspicionless searches, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis certainly must
have been different, if not the outcome of the case.
Had these cases been discussed, the court at the very least would
have had to grapple with the fact that this search was in no way relat107
ed to public safety—as was admitted by the government —in tension
with Chandler. It would have been forced to explain a holding that
contradicted Edmond, which explicitly declared unconstitutional any
suspicionless searches that are for the primary purpose of gathering
108
The government uncon“evidence of violations of the penal law.”
trovertibly admitted that the search program discussed in Gonzalez was
109
And fidesigned to elicit evidence of violations of the penal laws.
nally, the court would have had to deal with the fact that the store detective who accosted Gonzalez was a law enforcement officer; as Ferguson made clear, a principle reason for finding the drug testing of
103
104

105

106
107
108
109

Id.
Id. at 799 (“If exclusion is the remedy, all too often ordinary people will want to say that
the [Fourth Amendment] right was not really violated. At first they will say it with a wink;
later, with a frown; and one day, they will come to believe it.”).
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (describing the two-pronged standard
for adjudicating whether counsel for a defendant is inadequate; the first prong is whether
the defendant’s counsel was factually inadequate (cause), and the second prong is
whether the inadequacy of that counsel prejudiced the defendant’s case (prejudice)).
Each of these cases was decided prior to October of 2001. Ferguson, the last case in this
line, was decided on March 21, 2001. Cf. Part II.C, supra.
Gonzalez, 300 F.3d at 1051(“Based on the government’s concessions . . . [the purpose of
the search] was to deter and apprehend theft by employees.”).
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45.
Theft is obviously a violation of the penal law. Catching and punishing such theft was the
purpose of the program that resulted in Gonzalez being caught stealing. As a result of his
being apprehended, Gonzalez pleaded guilty to larceny, which is a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 641. See Gonzalez, 300 F.3d at 1050 n.3.
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pregnant women unconstitutional was the “entanglement with law
110
enforcement.” Given these considerations, it is likely that the result
in Gonzalez would have been markedly different had the defendant
been even remotely sympathetic or had his counsel been even minimally effective on appeal. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis
111
in this case is incorrect and ought to be reexamined.
IV. RECONSIDERATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXIT SEARCHES
In light of the heightened scrutiny now required of suspicionless
searches based on Supreme Court precedent in Chandler, Edmond,
and Ferguson, the exit searches as presently carried out are unconstitutional. Allowing for broad discretion to conduct searches of any
person departing a government building contravenes the now extremely limited scope of permissible special needs searches.
To briefly reiterate the nature of these exit searches: they are
conducted on every person leaving a building without a warrant,
probable cause, or even individualized suspicion. They are conducted
by police officers and, exactly as the government conceded in Gonzalez, the only plausible justification for them is apprehension of
crime—there is no safety interest at stake, whatsoever. Exit searches
are performed on both government employees and visitors. And,
they are conducted on individuals who have already undergone one
invasive, suspicionless search—the search required to enter the building. Any safety issue, such as a concern that someone might unlawfully possess a gun or explosives, must undoubtedly have already been
addressed by the previously conducted entry search.
For suspicionless searches to be unrelated in any way to public
safety directly contradicts the lessons of Chandler and makes them instantly suspect. Recall the poignant language from the Chandler decision: “But where . . . public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the
Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter
112
Even if these searches are quick, exhow conveniently arranged.”
pedient, necessary to stop theft, or desired by agencies, they cannot
be found constitutional.
The exit search regimes further fail Edmond analysis—which proscribes suspicionless searches for the purposes of general crime control—because they are for the purpose of ferreting out those who
110
111

112

Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79 n.15 (citations omitted).
It is important to note again that Gonzalez’s ineffective counsel failed to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari in this case. Consequently, the Supreme Court has never had
an opportunity to examine the issue of exit searches specifically.
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).
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have stolen items from government buildings and in part for deterring those who might otherwise steal, both law enforcement purposes.
And to put the proverbial icing on the cake, these searches contravene Ferguson, which makes explicit the maxim that if a suspicionless search is conducted by law enforcement, it is most likely illegitimate. Recall also the powerful language from that case: “In other
special needs cases, we have tolerated suspension of the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant or probable cause requirement in part because there was no law enforcement purpose behind the searches in
those cases, and there was little, if any, entanglement with law en113
Every exit search thus far identified is conducted by
forcement.”
police officers clad in traditional uniforms and armed with a deadly
weapon. This systematic search system of thousands of people on a
daily basis by uniformed police officers looking for mere theft without individualized suspicion cannot pass constitutional muster in
light of the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence, and it therefore
must be seen as an unreasonable infringement on our constitutionally guaranteed rights.
V. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO ASSERTIONS OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
Several objections naturally follow from this Essay’s assertion that
exit searches are unconstitutional: (1) that individuals lack an expectation of privacy when exiting government buildings; (2) that people
have consented to being exit searched by virtue of their presence in
government buildings; and (3) that Fourth Amendment rights are
overridden if an exit search is justified by safety or security interests.
The first and second objections are considered and rejected, while
the third objection is accepted as a limited possibility—one that has
not been identified in any of the presently-known exit search schemes
affected by the government—which could theoretically be found reasonable under the current Supreme Court jurisprudence.
A. Expectation of Privacy
Analyzing exit searches based on the plurality opinion in O’Connor
114
v. Ortega might tempt an argument that those who enter government buildings have no expectation of privacy in their personal be113
114

Ferguson, 532 U.S at 79 n.15.
480 U.S. at 711-729 (1987) (approving the search of the office of a government physician
by balancing the physician’s expectation of privacy against the government’s interest in
the efficient operation of the workplace).
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longings. Every exit search scheme actually identified is being performed on persons who have already been searched upon entering
the government building. Signs are often posted outside of buildings
where the government has implemented these procedures which inform people of the searches ahead of time and allow them to choose
not to enter the building. By entering these buildings, do individuals
cede their expectations of privacy until after they have left?
In O’Connor, the Court held that a government-employed physician had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, such that a
115
In light of
search thereof triggered Fourth Amendment concerns.
that decision, a plurality of the Court then established a two-part test
for determining whether a workplace search is reasonable: (1)
whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
thing to be searched, and (2) if so, the individual’s privacy right must
be balanced against the “government’s need for supervision, control,
116
and the efficient operation of the workplace.”
Dr. Ortega was found to have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in at least his desk and file cabinets because he did not share his office with others and kept personal items out of sight in his desk and
117
file cabinets. The government interest informing the other side of
the balancing test was the “efficient and proper operation of the
118
workplace.” Indeed, the plurality found a special need for searches
without probable cause in two situations: “legitimate work-related,
noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related
119
However, the Court remanded the case without demisconduct.”
ciding the ultimate issue because the factual record from the district
court was incomplete and further proceedings were required to determine the “reasonableness of both the inception of the search and
120
its scope” pursuant to the plurality’s announced rules.
Even if we were to treat the plurality opinion in O’Connor as a
holding, there are a number of caveats ensuring that its rules do not
apply to exit searches. The first issue is that, by its own terms,
O’Connor likely does not apply to the closed, personal luggage that is
the subject of exit searches:
Not everything that passes through the confines of the business address
can be considered part of the workplace context, however. An employee
115
116
117

118
119
120

Id. at 718.
Id. at 719-20.
Id. at 718-19; cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposed to the public, even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”).
O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 723.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 729.
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may bring closed luggage to the office . . . or a handbag or briefcase each
workday. While whatever expectation of privacy the employee has in the
existence and the outward appearance of the luggage is affected by its
presence in the workplace, the employee’s expectation of privacy in the
contents of the luggage is not affected in the same way. The appropriate
standard for a workplace search does not necessarily apply to a piece of
closed personal luggage, a handbag, or a briefcase that happens to be
121
within the employer’s business address.

A person’s expectation of privacy in a closed bag is not diminished
simply because that bag is brought to work.
Yet, even assuming, arguendo, that the presence of an exit search
program diminishes the reasonable expectation of privacy in closed
personal items on federal property, O’Connor does not constitutionally justify their use. The hospital administrators in O’Connor had individualized suspicion that Ortega had engaged in work-related mis122
conduct; by definition, no such suspicion exists with an exit search.
O’Connor approved a work-related search, “unrelated to illegal con123
duct”; an exit search is specifically designed to root out illegal con124
duct, notably theft. O’Connor approved searches performed by a civilian supervisor, specifically stating that the opinion cannot be taken
125
to justify searches conducted by law enforcement. Exit searches are
conducted by police officers and therefore O’Connor explicitly disallows them. And, even if exit searches were hypothetically performed
by civilians, such as museum employees, the analysis would not
change; the rule is now clear, based on Chandler, Edmond, and Ferguson, that exit searches must be safety-based, and not for the purposes
of discovering criminal activity.
B. Consent
126

Another objection may be based upon the principles of consent.
Although persons on federal property do not have a diminished ex121
122

123
124
125

126

Id. at 716.
Id. at 726. Individualized suspicion was discussed in the case and determined to exist, but
was not a dispositive issue. Had there been a lack of individualized suspicion, the Court
would have been compelled to determine whether individualized suspicion is a necessary
component of reasonableness.
Id. at 721.
See supra, note 107 and accompanying text.
O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 717 (“Individuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private employer. The operational realities of the workplace, however, may make some employees’ expectations of privacy unreasonable when an intrusion is by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement official.”).
Attempting to debate the merits of what constitutes consent is largely beyond the scope of
this Essay, as it is a tortured, normative issue that is not easily agreed upon and depends
largely upon context.
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pectation of privacy in their personal items, 127 it is possible that entrance onto federal property constitutes consent to being searched
and thus prevents the constitutional issue from being reached. This
argument is especially salient in the context of exit-searching employees and independent contractors doing business with the government; these individuals are the most pervasively exit-searched and
presumably “consent” to being searched as a condition of their employment. Moreover, signs are often posted outside of buildings
where exit searches are performed, notifying those entering that they
must consent to being searched. However, there are a number of
considerations that must be seen as undermining consent in this context, making it suspect, invalid, or unconstitutional.
1. Courts Consistently Abandon Consent as an Issue
The Supreme Court has mentioned in dicta on a number of occasions that a possible cure to an otherwise unconstitutional search is
128
consent. As discussed earlier, the Fourth Amendment creates a regime where choice reigns supreme—individuals have the right to
choose what things to keep hidden from public view and what things
129
Yet, in every case where the Court has adjudicated the
to reveal.
130
constitutionality of a special needs search, consent has dropped out
as an issue altogether. Every single case could effectively be recategorized as one in which the aggrieved party consented. In MartinezFuerte, for example, driving through a fixed checkpoint—or even driving near an international border—could be seen as consenting to a
search. Engaging in high school athletics, as in Acton, could be recast
as a consent issue. Working for the government, as in O’Connor,
could be seen as tacit consent to a search, especially if an employee
signed a paper authorizing a search or if warning signs were posted
notifying employees of the possibility of being searched. No doubt
the drug testing of pregnant women at a hospital, as in Ferguson,
131
could be seen as consensual.
Yet, the Court has consistently refused to analyze these cases in
terms of consent, ignoring the consent issue altogether, or “necessari127
128

129
130
131

See Part V.A, supra.
See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967) (“[E]xcept in certain carefully
defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.”) (emphasis added).
See Part II, supra.
See generally Parts II.B & II.C, supra.
See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (lamenting the majority opinion in part
because he believed that the taking of the urine specimens was consensual and therefore
constitutional).
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ly assum[ing]” that searches were conducted without informed con132
This is notwithstanding the fact that it is the policy of the
sent.
Court to decide cases on nonconstitutional grounds when possible,
avoiding the constitutional issue unless absolutely necessary to decide
133
a case. This proves that the consent issue in these cases must have
been affirmatively ignored, rather than merely “not reached,” because any of these cases could have been cast aside on the narrow issue of consent without reaching a constitutional holding.
This glaring rejection of consent arguments also extends to government workers, despite the pervasiveness of consent as a defense by
134
private employers to defeat employee lawsuits in other contexts. In
Gonzalez, the only case that discusses exit searches specifically, consent
135
was also largely ignored by the Court, despite the admission by the
appellant that he “understood ‘that employees were required to allow
such searches’ because he had signed something when he started
136
Consent was even summarily discarded as an
work so indicating.”
issue in City of Ontario v. Quon, the only other case in which the Supreme Court again grappled with the issues decided by the plurality
137
in O’Connor, a case in which consent was more than palpable. Consequently, it is unclear that consent is even a serious consideration at
all in cases of special needs searches, as courts uniformly ignore any
inkling of consent and reach the constitutional issue—even when
consent is assuredly manifest.

132
133

134

135
136
137

Id. at 76, 93.
See, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng’g, 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984) (“It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint, however, that this Court will not reach constitutional
questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”).
See, e.g., Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Sup. Ct., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 187 (Ct. App. 1997)
(rejecting a former employee’s claims of invasion of privacy and wrongful discharge despite having been required by her employer to disrobe and display her vagina as a condition of employment, based on the fact that the employee had consented).
United States v. Gonzales, 300 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We do not reach the issue of whether Mr. Gonzalez consented to the search . . . .”).
Id. at 1050. If this did not constitute consent, virtually no action could logically be conceived as consensual in these cases.
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619 (2010). In this case, the Court approved the legitimate “noninvestigatory, work-related” search of an employee’s cell phone, which
turned up evidence of the sending of sexually explicit messages by Sgt. Quon to his mistress during work hours. Id. at 2626, 2628. Despite the fact that the city owned the cell
phone Quon was using, that Quon had signed a computer consent policy giving the city
the ability to monitor employees’ e-mail and internet use, and that the city explicitly
warned Quon that text messages would be treated the same as e-mails for the purpose of
monitoring, the Court all but ignored the obvious consent issue and went on to decide
whether the search was constitutionaly valid in light of O’Connor. Id. at 2625.
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2. Consent Is Coerced
Despite this analysis, if consent remains a consideration in cases of
suspicionless special needs searches, any consent given should be
seen as invalid because it is necessarily coerced. One clear reason for
this assertion is that the subject of an exit search may not withdraw
138
his consent to be searched. If a person could withdraw consent to
be exit-searched, that would effectively eviscerate all of its purposes—
deterring and discovering theft. Anyone who did not wish to be
searched, whether stealing or not, could merely refuse the search.
But if there is no meaningful choice in the matter, then the subject is
139
Coercion denecessarily being coerced at the time of the search.
stroys consent, and without consent, the analysis must return to
Fourth Amendment reasonableness; and we now know that exit
searches are unreasonable standing alone.
3. Requiring Consent to Be Searched Violates the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine
Even if one were able to overcome the coercion hurdle and argue
that consent given to be searched is valid, exit searches still remain
unconstitutional. For the government to condition a benefit upon
giving up one’s constitutional rights is itself violative of the Constitu140
tion—it contravenes the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is the “principle that the
government cannot condition a benefit on the requirement that a
141
Thus, the “government may
person forgo a constitutional right.”
not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional
142
“Unconstitutional conditions problems arise when the govright.”
ernment offers a benefit on condition that the recipient perform or
forego an activity that a preferred constitutional right normally pro-
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See Part I, supra.
The concept of coercion is not limited to a lack of meaningful choice, but has often been
defined as something less strict. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583
(1968) (“A procedure need not be inherently coercive in order that it be held to impose
an impermissible burden upon the assertion of a constitutional right.”).
For the seminal work on unconstitutional conditions, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1988) (describing the definition of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, its importance as a tool in correcting and deterring
suppression of constitutional rights by the government, and its uneven application by the
Supreme Court).
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 980 (2006).
Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1997); (citing
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
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tects from government interference.” 143 In the exit search context,
the government requires an individual to surrender Fourth Amendment rights in order to utilize its property and gain any appurtenant
benefits.
This doctrine applies equally to employees of the federal government and visitors to its properties. Entering government property
confers a benefit on those who choose to do so. Employees enjoy the
benefits of employment, including compensation; the benefit for visitors consists of whatever reason induced them to enter the build144
ing. Nor are the benefits offered by the government a mere gratui145
ty—government benefits are the “new property” of individuals.
The problem here is not that privacy may not generally be alienated to other private persons: “unconstitutional conditions cases ask
not whether liberties are alienable generally, but only whether gov146
ernment may induce their surrender.” The exercise of an unconstitutional condition allows the government to achieve an end-run
around rights, which it would not be able to do if it did not offer a
benefit. Allowing for unconstitutional conditions destroys private or147
148
dering, diminishes the evenhandedness of government, and cre149
ates a constitutional caste system.
The problem with the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is
that, though it has existed for a century, it is unevenly applied by the
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Sullivan, supra note 140, at 1421-22.
For example, visitors benefit from access to the extensive research materials available at
the Library of Congress. See History, Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/about/
history.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2012) (noting that the Library collection contains more
than 155 million items).
See generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); see also Charles A.
Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245,
1255 (“Many of the most important . . . entitlements now flow from government . . . [s]uch sources of security, whether private or public, are no longer regarded as
luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they are essentials, fully deserved, and in no sense
a form of charity.”); cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970) (regarding with approval and accepting Reich’s views on government benefits, and finding actual property
rights in one of the most seemingly obvious government “gratuities”—welfare benefits).
Sullivan, supra note 140, at 1489-90.
Id. at 1492 (“Government may not directly command or forbid actions protected by individual rights of speech, association, or reproductive privacy, for example, because these
decisions belong in the realm of private ordering rather than government control.”).
Id. at 1496 (“Unconstitutional conditions inherently classify potential beneficiaries into
two groups: those who comply with the condition . . . and those who do not.”). Because
entry into a government building and the attendant benefits provided thereby are conditioned on submission to an exit search, those who choose not to give up their Fourth
Amendment rights are necessarily excluded from the benefits.
Id. at 1497-98. Those who, for example, do not as readily need government benefits may
preserve their constitutional liberties, while those who most need benefits, perhaps the
indigent, must give up their constitutional rights in order to obtain the benefit.
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Supreme Court. In many cases, the Court will strike down a government condition based on finding it to be an unconstitutional condi150
tion, but in other cases, it will uphold laws that look identical to
151
Consequently,
those with unconstitutional conditions problems.
this uncertainty makes it difficult to predict which treatment or outcome any particular case will receive.
One possible answer to this quandary is the germaneness of the
condition to the benefit: the more germane a condition is to a bene152
The less
fit, the more deferential the review a court will conduct.
germane, the more the condition looks coercive, like “extortion,
153
bribery, manipulation, and subterfuge.” Thus, for example, conditioning welfare benefits on residence in a state is highly attenuated,
but refusing to subsidize discussions of abortions in federally funded
family planning clinics is more germane.
Conditioning the entry to a government building upon being exitsearched clearly creates an unconstitutional condition—individuals
are required to relinquish their Fourth Amendment rights in order to
obtain the benefits of entry. And, the ability to come to work every
day in a military commissary or to read books in the Library of Congress is exceedingly irrelevant to the government interest in exitsearching a person. With no safety interest at stake in an exit search,
the required nexus between the benefit and the search is minimal
and most probably nonexistent. When the true definition of and
purposes behind exit searches come to light, these searches increasingly resemble manipulation—if a person wants a benefit the government provides in its buildings then they ought to be prepared to
surrender their constitutional privacy rights. This practice plainly violates the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
C. A Safety-Based Exit Search
Finally, there remains the possibility that certain discrete, hypothetical exit searches could be constitutionally justified by legitimate
safety concerns. If safety-based, an exit search bears greater resem150
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See e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969) (holding that denying welfare
benefits to an individual who has lived in a state for less than a year impermissibly burdens, among other rights, the fundamental right to interstate travel); Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549-50 (2001) (invalidating a statute that prevented lawyers receiving funding from the Legal Services Corporation from making certain arguments on
their clients’ behalves).
See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 179 (1991) (upholding a law that prohibited
“counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning” for familyplanning organizations that receive federal funding).
See Sullivan, supra note 140, at 1457.
Id. at 1456-57. See pages 1456-68 for a full explication of the germaneness issue.
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blance to an entry search and contains far fewer of the problematic
154
hallmarks that this Essay has thus far described. Indeed, if some exit search scheme were genuinely safety-based, it would likely pass constitutional muster. Some examples that could epitomize a constitutional exit search might be searches conducted on engineers leaving
a nuclear power plant or National Security Agency (NSA) employees
privy to documents containing classified national-security infor155
mation as they leave the NSA facility.
However, my contention concerning exit searches is that they are
unconstitutional as observed in practice. The regulations authorizing
their promulgation are exceedingly broad, giving limitless discretion
156
And
to agencies to create and implement exit search schemes.
those exit searches admittedly have nothing to do with safety concerns; they are genuinely for the law enforcement purpose of theft
apprehension and not an inkling more. Some exit searches could be
constitutional, but this analysis shows that no exit search thus far
identified is constitutional.
CONCLUSION
Exit searches, as currently implemented by our government, are
patently unconstitutional. Pursuant to broad, discretion-less regulations, administrators of public buildings have been given license to
implement these search schemes without any oversight. Day-in and
day-out, these searches impinge on our Fourth Amendment rights to
be free of the strictures of a government arbitrarily and unreasonably
destroying the privacy we are due as autonomous beings. These
searches undermine liberty while carrying vast potential for abuse.
At one time, the Supreme Court might have approved of these
searches, when it openly deferred to legislatures and executives in
their assertions of “special needs” justifying this or that suspicionless
search. Perhaps realizing the unintended consequences of this openended jurisprudence, the Court has, over the past two decades, seriously curtailed the ability of the government to make these unjustifiable searches a reality. In contrast with the now-abandoned deference, the heightened scrutiny of today’s Court requires a specifically
154
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Compare this with the justification for entry searches presented in McMorris v. Alioto, 567
F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1978), which was the prevention of serious harm to government buildings by subversive individuals looking to detonate explosives.
This list is far from exhaustive. Given the intentional lack of clarity surrounding the nature of government occupations related to important security concerns, it is impossible to
compile an exhaustive list—hypothetical safety-based searches such as these require a
case-by-case reasonableness determination under the Fourth Amendment.
See 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.370 (2011).
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articulable safety interest to search without suspicion and mandates
that these searches not be for the purpose of ferreting out violations
of the penal laws nor entangled with law enforcement officers. The
exit searches being carried out daily violate all three of these conditions and consequently, cannot be seen as constitutional.
Any objections attempting to preserve the constitutionality of exit
searches despite the Supreme Court’s contraction of the special
needs exception must fail. Individuals do not forfeit their expectation of privacy in closed personal items merely because they work for
our government or wish to receive a benefit from access to its properties. Any nominal consent to an exit search is most certainly coerced,
making it suspect and invalid. And, even if consent to an exit search
could be shown to be a valid waiver of privacy, allowing the government to condition a benefit on the surrender of constitutional
rights—which it could not require if it did not offer the benefit—
violates the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Violations such as
these unfortunately make our government appear more like an unscrupulous rights-trader in the business of achieving an illicit goal
than a defender of liberty. This behavior is incompatible with our
Constitution.
This is not to say that certain hypothetical safety-based exit
searches could not be constitutional, but only that the exit searches
presently effectuated buckle under serious legal examination. Consequently, courts should heavily scrutinize exit searches and, finding
them unconstitutional, return to us the rights that are presently being
abrogated without justification.

